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Abstract—In this paper we propose a collaborative framework
to carry out multi-area dynamic security assessment over an
interconnection operated by a team of TSOs responsible of
different areas. In this framework each TSO does his part of
the work and, thanks to information exchange and coordination
rules, potential security problems can be detected by all the
involved TSOs. We find that distributed multi-area security
assessment is achievable and useful if, on the one hand, each TSO
can provide an appropriate dynamic equivalent model of his area
and if, on the other hand, he is able to publish stability bounds on
his inflows under which the dynamic performance of his system
would remain acceptable. We then discuss the notions of dynamic
equivalent model and external stability domain characterization
of an area and identify techniques for deriving such equivalents
and stability bounds within the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to economic, environmental, and regulatory pressures
electric power systems tend to interconnect more strongly,
grow in size, and operate closer to their stability limits. Con-
sequently, the proper management of these systems becomes
more an more complex from all perspectives (planning, oper-
ation, control, etc.). In spite of the fact that our knowledge of
power system dynamics and the quality of available dynamic
security analysis software have significantly progressed during
the last few decades, the frequency of blackouts or quasi-
blackouts in the recent years has been significantly higher
than during the seventies, eighties and early nineties. Thus, the
perception of the stakeholders of this field is that significant
efforts have to be made urgently in order to be able to
reestablish the security of electricity supply at the expected
level, or at least to prevent its further degradation during the
coming years.
Among the topics that are being debated by the experts, one
that has received quite a lot of attention concerns the question
of whether it is more appropriate to restructure the planning,
operation and control of interconnected electric power systems
in a top-down or bottom-up approach. In this context, a top-
down approach would imply to create one or several higher
level organizations (so-called MEGA-TSOs), and to transfer
some of the responsibilities of TSOs at this level. A bottom-
up approach, on the other hand, would imply to strengthen
the exchange of information among TSOs and improve the
mutual coordination of their activities. Currently, top-down
approaches are being implemented in North-America and
Russia, while the bottom-up one prevails in the European
interconnection. One is forced to admit that none of these
experiences is totally convincing, since both of them have not
been able to prevent the occurrence of some major blackouts
or quasi-blackouts in the recent years [1]–[3].
In this paper, we consider the bottom-up approach. Within
this context, some work has already been done in the recent
years to address the problems of state-estimation and static-
security assessment (load-flow computations) [4]–[10]. But
there remain several open questions which have been insuffi-
ciently well treated, such as the case of multi-area dynamic
security assessment, security control and optimization, but
which need also to be addressed if one wants to implement a
bottom-up approach to large electric power systems planning,
operation and control.
We focus on the specific question of whether and under
which technical conditions it would be feasible, useful, or
desirable to carry out real-time dynamic security assessment in
a distributed way in a large multi-area interconnection. To this
end, we propose to use the generic collaborative framework
described in [9] (and further studied in the context of static
security assessment in [10]) and analyse its features. More
precisely, we consider how to carry out dynamic security
assessment over an interconnection, in a framework where
each TSO does part of the work and, thanks to minimal
but sufficient information exchange and adequate coordination
rules, all potential instabilities could be detected by all the
involved TSOs.
Our analysis shows that distributed multi-area dynamic
security assessment would be achievable and useful if, on the
one hand, each TSO could provide an appropriate equivalent
dynamic model of his area to all other TSOs and if, on the
other hand, he would agree to publish bounds on his inflows
under which he can ensure that the dynamic performance
of his system will remain acceptable. We also discuss some
techniques for computing such equivalents and bounds and
examine the conditions under which one could expect that all
TSOs will be willing to exchange the required information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
principles of the proposed collaborative multi-area dynamic
security assessment framework. Section III considers the im-
plementation in this scheme of the construction, exchange and
use of dynamic equivalents and stability domains computed by
each TSO for his subsystem. Section IV discusses the overall
approach in terms of feasibility and desirability, concludes and
gives suggestions for future research directions.
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Fig. 1. A multi-area interconnected power system
II. A COLLABORATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DYNAMIC
SECURITY ASSESSMENT OF MULTI-AREA SYSTEMS
In this section we look at real-time multi-area security
assessment in a rather abstract way and without making any
distinction between static and dynamic aspects.
A. Single TSO viewpoint on security assessment
Let us consider a large scale (synchronously or asyn-
chronously) interconnected electric power system as depicted
in Figure 1. We adopt the viewpoint of one of the TSOs (for
example, TSO1 highlighted in Figure 1) in order to formulate
the objectives of security assessment. We focus on the real-
time context i.e. the objectives that TSO1 follows when he
carries out security assessment in real-time. Notice that we
consider below that a tie-line interconnecting the system of
TSOi with that of TSOj belongs to both areas i and j.
The primary goal of TSO1 is to detect among all plausible
contingencies that could happen in his area those that would
lead to undesired system performance in his area. He will
also be interested in identifying events originating in other
subsystems that would affect the integrity of his own area, and
may wish to detect contingencies or maneuvers originating in
his area that would lead to problems outside his area.
If TSO1 were alone to make this assessment, he would
thus have to carry out the following procedure: (i) run state-
estimation from a real-time snapshot of the whole inter-
connection; (ii) set up static and dynamic models and a
contingency list for the whole interconnection; (iii) evaluate
the consequences inside his area of all contingencies, and the
consequences outside his area of all contingencies originating
in his area. Obviously, if all TSOs would consider themselves
as alone, each one of them would have to do this work on his
side from his own viewpoint of what is inside and outside.
B. Assumptions for collaboration
Let us state some assumptions which will make it possible to
share security assessment among the TSOs in a fair way, while
reaching the same quality of analysis, i.e. the detection among
all plausible contingencies over the whole interconnected
system of those that might lead to undesirable consequences
somewhere in the system and the notification in real-time of
potential threats to the concerned1 TSOs.
1A TSO is concerned by a dangerous contingency if it leads to undesirable
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Fig. 2. Computations and data flows for TSOi (novel functions in blue)
Our first assumption is that each TSOi wants to identify the
dangerous contingencies among those that would originate in
his system (including his tie-lines) irrespectively of whether
the undesirable consequences of these contingencies are local-
ized in his own area or an other area.
Our second assumption is that each TSOi can provide
enough information to any TSOj (∀j 6= i) so that TSOj can
detect among the contingencies that he will analyze those that
have undesirable consequences in the area of TSOi.
Our last assumption is that if TSOi has identified some
contingency in his subsystem which has potentially undesir-
able consequences in the system of TSOj , he is willing to
inform TSOj and provide him with the information needed to
evaluate these consequences.
We believe that these assumptions are quite reasonable.
Below we will analyze regulatory and technical concerns that
have to be solved to ensure also their feasibility. If all these
conditions were satisfied, then one can distribute the work
among TSOs in the following way.
C. Distribution of information and computations
The framework that we propose is a symmetric scheme
where all TSOs carry out their work in parallel and in the same
way, thrust each other, are fair, and do their best to identify
potential security threats. Let us denote by Di(c) the real-
time data about the system of TSOi (SCADA, state-estimator
output, contingency lists etc.) that he obtains from his own
EMS system at some security assessment cycle c. We propose
that TSOi does the following at each cycle (see Figure 2):
• TSOi computes from Di(c) the information Ii(c) that he
will provide to all other TSOs about his system.
• TSOi broadcasts Ii(c) to all other TSOs. At the same
time, he collects {Ij(c),∀j 6= i} broadcasted by them.
• TSOi computes the consequences of all the plausible
contingencies originating in his area. He uses in this
process Di(c) and {Ij(c),∀j 6= i}. Let us call the results
of this assessment Ai(c).
• For each j 6= i, TSOi computes from Ai(c) and Ij(c)
the contingencies that are possibly dangerous for TSOj
and the information required by TSOj to evaluate the
consequences in his system of these latter. We call this
information Aj,i(c).
• For each j 6= i, TSOi sends Aj,i(c) to TSOj . At the same
time, he collects Ai,j(c) sent by TSOj to him.
• TSOi uses {Ai,j(c),∀j 6= i} and Di(c) to evaluate the
exact consequences in his area of the contingencies orig-
inating in other areas that were signalled as potentially
dangerous for his area by the other TSOs.
In Figure 2 the boxes in blue correspond to the novel functions
that are specific to our collaborative multi-area scheme, and
the function which sends analysis results (RES) to other TSOs
is replicated as many times as there are other TSOs.
D. Detailed vs reduced exchange of information
1) Detailed information exchange: A (rather) trivial way to
implement the above scheme is to exchange at any time all the
available information. With our notations, this would consist
in setting Ii(c) = Di(c) and setting Aj,i(c) = Ai(c). In other
words the TSOs would exchange all their data at each cycle
and all the results of their security assessment computations.
We call this the distributed computation scheme with detailed
information exchange.
2) Reduced information exchange: The detailed scheme
can be modified into a scheme of mere reduced information
exchange in the following way.
First we assume that each TSOi reduces the information
Ii(c) sent to the others to the following three items:
• an equivalent model of the system of TSOi which allows
to compute voltages at the boundary buses from currents.
We will denote by Ei(c) such an equivalent;
• detailed real-time data about tie-lines originating in the
area of TSOi. We will call this data by Ti(c);
• a filtering procedure which allows to decide whether
some current injections into the system of TSOi are able
to yield constraint violations or instabilities in his system.
We will denote this filtering procedure by Fi(c).
Second we assume that TSOi computes Aj,i(c) according to
the following steps:
• he uses the equivalent models {Ej(c),∀j 6= i} together
with his own data Di(c) to simulate effects Ai(c) of the
contingencies originating in his system;
• he applies the filter Fj(c) to Ai(c) to identify the con-
tingencies that could endanger the system of TSOj ;
• he computes Aj,i(c) by extracting from Ai(c) the post-
contingency tie-line currents into the system of TSOj , for
each one of the identified contingencies;
• he uses the post-contingency currents Ai,j(c) computed
and sent to him by the other TSOs and his own system
data Di(c) to compute the internal state of his system for
each potentially dangerous external contingency.
In this scheme, the data exchange may be significantly
reduced at the expense of additional computations. Indeed,
each TSO now has to compute at each cycle an equivalent
model and a contingency filtering procedure that he will send
to others instead of his detailed data. In addition, for each
external contingency detected as potentially dangerous for his
system by another TSO, he will have to compute the internal
effects in his system from the post-contingency currents pro-
vided by this other TSO. On the other hand, the complexity of
the security assessment studies carried out by each TSO will
normally be reduced significantly in this scheme. Indeed, for
the simulation of his internal contingencies a TSO will use a
detailed model only of his area together with the equivalent
models of the other ones; for the evaluation of internal effects
of external contingencies he will use his detailed model of his
own system together with the post-contingency currents of his
tie-lines computed by the other TSOs.
Thus, if the equivalent models {Ei(c),∀j 6= i} are compact
and if the filtering procedures are selective enough, the security
assessment computations and the communication requirements
of each TSOi could indeed be significantly reduced in the
reduced information scheme.
3) Comparison with a centralized computation scheme:
Let us first notice that with respect to a central computation
scheme where a single node carries out all the computations,
the distributed computation schemes have a redundancy in
computations: indeed the contingencies consisting of events
on the tie-lines are computed twice.
Moreover, in terms of communications, the requirements are
different: in the distributed scheme with detailed information
the data Di(c) have to be broadcasted to all other TSOs,
while in a centralized scheme it would just be sent to the
central computing node; on the other hand, with the centralized
approach the results of computations for each contingency
leading to threats in some area would have to be sent back
to the TSO of this area.
With respect to these two schemes the main weakness of the
distributed scheme with reduced information is that its quality
relies on the quality of the equivalent models and filtering
procedures that are provided by each TSO.
E. Verification of information quality and incentives
The redundant computations of the distributed scheme can
be exploited to verify the quality of the information exchanged
among TSOs. Indeed, when assessing the consequences of a
tie-line contingency between TSOi and TSOj , TSOi uses a
detailed model of his area and the equivalent model provided
by TSOj (and of the other areas), while the situation is re-
versed for TSOj . If the equivalent models are of good quality,
these computations should lead to the same results in terms
of post-contingency tie-line flows of all interconnections. In
principle all TSOs can verify this consistency, provided that
it is agreed that post-contingency currents subsequent to the
tripping of (or a fault on) a tie-line are systematically broad-
casted. Notice also that with the information made available by
the framework, each TSO can actually verify the consequences
on his system of all possible events in all possible tie-lines in
the system, if he wishes to do so.
In addition to the possibility of verification, another essential
feature of the scheme is to create incentives for each TSO
to provide high-quality equivalents and filters to the others.
Indeed, the information Ai,j(c) that TSOi will receive in return
from the other TSOs depends critically on the quality of the
information Ii(c) that he provides to them.
Taken together, these two features of the framework are
probably sufficient to make sure that the TSOs will do their
best to provide high quality information to the others.
While the quality of the contingency filters Fi provided by
the TSOs is less critical, there is also some natural incentive
for this. Indeed, a too optimistic filter (leading to many non-
detections) creates the risk for TSOi that some dangerous
external contingency will not be detected. On the other hand,
a too pessimistic filter (leading to many false alarms) will lead
to higher data traffic and give the impression to the other TSOs
that the system of TSOi is less secure than it actually is.
F. Regulatory and technical feasibility
The kind of information that a TSO will be able to exchange
with other TSOs depends on regulatory aspects (confidentiality
obligations, or on the contrary obligation of transparency)
and on technical feasibility. From the technical point of
view the trade-off between detailed information and black-box
equivalents is as follows: detailed data is theoretically easy to
provide but practically difficult to exchange and exploit; good
and compact equivalent models are theoretically difficult to
provide but practically easy to exchange and exploit. There-
fore, the possibility to implement the framework will depend
on progress both in regulatory frameworks and in technical
state-of-the-art.
III. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
To decompose the dynamic modelling and stability assess-
ment of a multi-area power system into sub-problems related
to each area, we clarify in this section what we mean by
dynamic model of an area and what we mean by a description
of its stability domain. On the road, we also discuss methods
to build models of reduced order and approximate stability
domain descriptions of a area from the information available
to a TSO responsible for this area.
A. Construction and use of dynamic equivalents
For the sake of the explanation, let us consider a power
system composed of two areas only and neglect some details
pertaining to some specific kinds of models such as disconti-
nuities, delays etc.
1) On the notion of dynamic model of a subsystem: In a
totally general and very abstract way (see e.g. [11]), one can
view a dynamic model of a system as a set of constraints over
the behaviours of all the variables of interest to describe this
system. Often, these behaviour constraints are expressed in
terms of mathematical equations. For example, in the case
of electric power systems dynamic security assessment, a
dynamic model is classically written as
x˙ = f(x, y, u) (1)
0 = g(x, y, u), (2)
where the variables of interest are voltages and currents (y),
those related to generator dynamics (denoted by x), and the
inputs u which can be used to take into the account the effect
of contingencies.
In a system with two areas, these eqautions become
x˙1 = f1(x1, y1, y1,2, u1) (3)
0 = g1(x1, y1, y1,2, u1), (4)
x˙2 = f2(x2, y2, y2,1, u2) (5)
0 = g2(x2, y2, y2,1, u2), (6)
0 = c1,2(y1,2, y2,1), (7)
where the subscript i denotes the internal variables partic-
ipating in the dynamic model of system i, and those with
subscript i, j those of system i which can also be seen from
j. The first two equations describe the dynamic model of
system 1, the second two that of system 2 and the last
equation states the coupling constraints imposed by their
interconnection written from the viewpoint of TSO1. In power
systems, the variables i, j are the currents in interconnections
and voltages at interconnecting nodes and the status of inputs
acting on the interconnections. At steady state, u = 0, and
f(x, y, 0) = g(x, y, 0) = 0.
2) Equivalent models for DSA: Let us consider the view-
point of TSO1 when he analyzes contingencies occurring
inside his system. TSO1 can use the above dynamic model
to carry out simulations and determine the behaviour of
the variables that are of interest to him. When he looks at
consequences inside his system, he is not interested by the
variables x2, y2 which pertain to the internal behaviour of
area 2. Thus these variables become latent variables for TSO1,
according to the terminology of [11],
Thus, for the sake of this analysis, the detailed equations
of area 2 could be replaced by any other dynamic model,
provided that it imposes the same constraints on the behaviour
of the interface variables y2,1. Thus in a totally general and
very abstract view, a dynamic equivalent model of system
2 seen from system 1 is merely a set of constraints on the
possible trajectories of the interface variables y1,2 which can
be imposed together with the model of system 1 and the
coupling constraints (7) to model the dynamic behavior of
system 1.
In power systems dynamic security assessment it is conve-
nient to formulate the equivalent model by a set of equations
with similar structure to the regular power system dynamic
models, namely
˙ˆx2 = fˆ2(xˆ2, yˆ2, y2,1) (8)
0 = gˆ2(xˆ2, yˆ2, y2,1), (9)
where yˆ2 and xˆ2 replace the detailed variables y2 and x2 and
fˆ and gˆ are defined under the assumption that u2 = 0 (no
internal disturbances in area 2). Ideally, this equivalent model
is such that the dimension of xˆ2 and yˆ2 are as small as possible
while imposing the same constraints on the behaviour of y2,1
as the original model.
Obviously, this scheme is straightforward to generalize to
the case of more than two areas. In general, when TSOi carries
out dynamic simulations, he will use in place of detailed
models of the other areas the equivalent ones together with
all the coupling constraints among all areas.
3) Exploitation of the dynamic equivalents: In our frame-
work, it is the responsibility of TSOi to provide the equivalent
model of his area to other TSOs. Then, any TSO can simulate
the behaviour of his area and of the interface variables
(voltages and currents) coupling all areas, for any contingency
originating in his area.
Let us denote by yki (0 : T ) = {yki,j(t),∀j 6= i, ∀t ∈ [0;T ]}
the trajectories of the interface variables of area i computed by
some other TSOk upon the simulation of one of his internal
contingencies. If TSOk sends the information yki (0 : T ) to
TSOi the latter can use this information as a model of the
remaining systems of the interconnection and couple it with
its own internal model to compute the detailed behaviour of
his area for the simulated contingency.
4) Construction of dynamic equivalent models: Since the
early days of power systems, a lot of work has been done in
order to build dynamic equivalents [12]–[17]. The approaches
include: coherency-based methods, modal-based methods, and
combinations of the two. Also ad hoc methods have been in
use, where the dynamic equivalent uses part of the detailed
structure of the equivalenced area together with nonlinear
models of some of its generator and load dynamics and a
linearized representation of the rest of the system.
Whatever the precise method and type of dynamic equiv-
alent, all of them fit in the framework described above.
However, in order to ensure that the dynamic equivalents
are accurate enough, they need to be properly maintained in
real-time. Indeed, compact dynamic equivalent models have
typically a limited range of validity and when the topology,
generation dispatch, or load change significantly they need
to be refreshed. We believe that in a context where each
TSO carries out a lot of detailed dynamic security assessment
studies in real-time, it should be possible to exploit and
complement these analyses with a new satellite function which
task would be to maintain the equivalent model of the area
under the responsibility of each TSO.
Within this respect we would like to pinpoint some recent
research carried out in constructing the dynamic equivalents
through artificial neural networks reported in [18], [19] and
[20]. The developed methodologies provide a voltage-current
dynamic equivalent of an external system with unknown
structure. In [18] and [19] two neural networks are used, one
to extract states of the reduced order equivalent and one to
predict the new states values of the external system. In [20] the
external system is represented in an input-output formulation
and only one neural network is used to predict system dynamic
behavior. The neural networks could be trained in real-time by
exploiting the results of the time-domain simulations that each
TSO runs with his detailed model for all his contingencies.
B. Construction and use of stability domain descriptions
In order to reduce the burden of computation in dynamic
security assessment it is useful to complete the tool for
time-domain simulation with some filtering techniques, which
allow to assess at low computational cost whether a certain
contingency is likely to be dangerous. In our framework, we
propose that TSOi provides to the other TSOs a filtering
procedure which would allow them to detect whether one of
the contingencies they have analyzed is potentially dangerous
for area i. We propose to construct such a filter by automatic
learning of an external stability domain description.
1) On the notion of external stability domain: Let us
consider again the subsystem 2 of the preceding section.
Contingencies in area 1 act on subsystem 2 via the coupling
constraints on the interface variables y2,1. When a contingency
is simulated by TSO1 he computes the trajectory of y2,1(0 :
T ). The question he wants to answer is whether the resulting
behaviour of system 2 will be stable or not. If he can determine
with sufficient certainty that it will be stable, he doesn’t have
to send the corresponding data to TSO2 and the latter doesn’t
have to carry out the computation of the internal behaviour of
his system.
Denoting by y[0,T ]2,1 the set of all possible behaviours of the
interface variables of area 2, an external stability domain of
area 2 is a subset F2 ⊂ y[0,T ]2,1 such that
P (Area2 is stable|y2,1(0 : T ) ∈ F2) ≥ 1− .
The description of F2 must be such that it is easy to check
whether a certain trajectory belongs to it.
2) Learning stability domain descriptions: Suppose that
TSO2 is careful and that initially he has no idea about the
external stability domain of his system. Thus, he will use as
first guess F2(0) = ∅ and he will receive at this first cycle
from TSO1 the signals y2,1(0 : T ) for every contingency
simulated by TSO1. He will analyse these signals, and can
thereby construct a sample of signals each one being labelled
as stable or unstable. Using this sample, he can use supervised
learning methods, such as decision tree induction [21], in order
to build a classifier that can be considered as a new description
F2(1) and send it to TSO1. At the next step, he will thus
receive from TSO1 only those signals which do not belong to
the set F2(1). He will analyse these signals and add them to
the sample of known signals and compute F2(2), and so on.
If at some cycle there is a significant change in his system
which might impact its stability domain, he would have to
re-run simulations over the whole sample of trajectories to
refresh their stability classification before retraining F2.
Notice that the external stability domain construction is not
used by TSO2 to check whether his internal contingencies
are potentially dangerous. Indeed, this stability domain is
valid and useful only for predicting the effects of external
disturbances (it is built under the assumption that u2 = 0).
External stability domain descriptions could be expressed as
the convex hull of the signals found to be stable in the past.
Assuming that the exact external stability domain is indeed a
convex set, this would guarantee that
P (Area2 is stable|y2,1(0 : T ) ∈ F2(c)) = 1,∀c.
Automatic learning can be used in order to derive an approx-
imation of this convex hull that can be described (and tested)
in a sufficiently simple manner.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced a collaborative framework for
multi-area security assessment. This framework relies on the
willingness of TSOs to exchange two main pieces of informa-
tion about the dynamic performance of their system.
The first piece is what we have called a dynamic equiv-
alent model, and is defined to be an information set that is
sufficiently rich to enable the computation by other TSOs of
their internal response and that of the interface variables of
the whole interconnection (e.g. tie-line currents and boundary
node voltages) in the post-contingency regimes caused by
contingencies originating in their system. Quite obviously, a
particular case of a dynamic “equivalent” which satisfies this
condition is the full detailed model. However, using more
compact dynamic equivalents (at least for a significant part of
the system) would lead to a more efficient and viable approach.
Hence we encourage research on the systematic construction
of dynamic equivalents.
The second piece of information is what we have called
in the beginning a contingency filter and later on an external
stability domain description. This is a piece of information
which allows any TSO to predict whether a contingency that
he has simulated could lead to instabilities in the area from
which the filter has been received. The filter should be such
that the probability of missing dangerous contingencies is very
low. Again a trivial (and useless) solution to this problem
would be to provide a filter which doesn’t filter at all. We
argue that supervised learning can be used in order to build
up good filters from the information that each TSO has anyhow
to generate during his analyses.
As a general conclusion, we can say that collaborative multi-
area dynamic security assessment is indeed feasible, useful and
hence desirable. In addition, we have explained how automatic
learning would allow to post-process the results of real-time
dynamic security analyses done in such a framework, so as
to progressively improve the quality of dynamic equivalent
models and the precision of the contingency filters. In this way,
each TSO could progressively run more and more contingency
analyses without saturating his computation budget or his
communication bandwidth.
Furthermore, we would like to stress that the proposed
framework does not rely on the use of the same software
package by all TSOs. It relies however on the agreement
among the TSOs on a common language that they will use to
exchange dynamic equivalent models and contingency filters.
We also believe that the collaborative framework that we have
described will help to increase the awareness of all TSOs about
the main weaknesses of the interconnection, and thus improve
security coordination.
Our future work will have to go deeper in the questions of
learning from simulations in the context of this framework.
At a higher level, we would like also to address multi-area
optimization and control in a similar framework and study the
properties of information sharing schemes appropriate in these
contexts of control.
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